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Defined Benefit Pension Plan Liabilities and International Asset Allocation 
Tongxuan Yang 
 
Whether pension funds efficiently allocate assets and hedge risk is a key concern of plan 
sponsors, plan participants, and the whole economy. For decades, economists have recognized 
the benefit of international diversification. But compared with the international level of asset 
allocation deserved from standard portfolio theory (Levy and Sarnat 1970 for example), the 
portfolios of institutional investors are far from optimal. Specifically, U.S. defined benefit (DB) 
plans hold too little in international assets and too much in domestic assets, reflecting the so-
called equity “home bias” puzzle.  
As distinct from mutual funds, DB plans have to meet their funding requirements. 
Therefore, only maximizing total assets is not enough for a DB pension plan; instead, DB plans 
should also take into account their liability patterns when determining asset allocations. We are 
interested in the question of whether pension liabilities should influence pension international 
asset allocation decisions, and whether including measures of liabilities might be part of the 
explanation for pension plan home bias. 
 In this paper, we employ a mean-variance approach to explore how DB pension plan 
international asset allocation patterns might change, after taking pension liabilities into account. 
We apply our model to a hypothetical U.S. DB pension plan. Our empirical analysis shows that 
taking account of pension liabilities in DB investment decisions does not explain the observed 
home bias. Consequently we conclude that home bias in U.S. DB pension plans is still a puzzle, 
and such plans could benefit substantially from holding more international assets.  
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 In what follows, we first show the benefit of international diversification of pension funds 
and illustrate the home bias puzzle of DB pension plans. Next, we develop a simple mean-
variance model to explore the impact of liabilities on pension fund international asset allocation. 
Then we provide an empirical analysis of a hypothetical pension plan, and provide some 
concluding comments. 
Home Bias and DB Pension Plan Liability 
 When foreign and domestic market returns are not perfectly correlated, domestic 
investors may benefit from international investment. Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Solnik (1988, 
1998) have shown the advantages of international portfolio diversification. As an institutional 
investor, a defined benefit pension plan must invest its assets in the capital market to back up 
retirement promises. As explained by Davis (2002), pension plans may benefit from international 
risk sharing for several reasons. First, international investment can broaden a pension plan’s 
efficient frontier, rewarding investors with a higher return for the same risk, or with lower risk 
for the same return. Second, foreign investment may offer inflation protection, as exchange rates 
depreciate during periods of inflation when domestic asset returns are poor. Third, especially in 
developing countries where the economy is volatile or where production is relatively 
concentrated, international investment can help pension plans diversify risk, offer more 
investment vehicles, and curtail shortfall risk.     
With the integration of international capital markets and the relaxation of capital controls, 
institutional investors’ holdings of foreign securities are increasing, as illustrated in Table 1. For 
instance, U.S. DB pension fund holdings of foreign securities increased from 0.7 percent in 1980 
to 11.8 percent in 1998. However, compared with Lewis’ (1995) recommendation that U.S. 
investors should hold over 40 percent of their assets internationally, actual investments are 
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strongly home-biased. French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and 
Werner (1995) also find that home bias is strong for U.S. investors.  
Table 1 here 
 Several explanations for investor home bias have been suggested in the international 
finance literature.1 Nevertheless, research in the past two decades suggests that none of these 
explanations is fully convincing. One rationale is that home equity may help hedge domestic 
risks such as inflation and non-tradable wealth. But Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) find that 
inflation hedge motives cannot explain home bias, and indeed sometimes the hedge motives are 
in the opposite direction than would be expected. Furthermore, Baxter and Jermann (1997) find 
that “international diversification puzzle” is deepened once the implications of non-tradable 
human capital are considered for portfolio composition. A second rationale for home bias is that 
foreign returns implicit in equities of domestic firms having overseas operations could mean that 
so-called “domestic” firms actually are substantially diversified internationally. Although this 
argument sounds plausible, Jacqillat and Solnik (1978) show that stocks of multinationals 
usually move quite closely with their respective national market indexes. A third rationale 
offered is that government restrictions, transaction costs, and tax policies might imply that 
diversification costs could exceed gains. For example, Lewis (1999) suggests that government 
restrictions and information costs might explain why emerging markets are biased away from 
holding equities in emerging market. On the other hand, this argument cannot explain the home 
bias puzzle for developed countries that do not face such restrictions. A fourth possible rationale 
is that information asymmetry generates hurdles for international investment, and “familiarity 
breeds investment” as argued by Huberman (2001). Yet it is unclear whether domestic investors 
actually have better information about domestic equities; for instance, Froot, O’Connell and 
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Seasholes (2001), Froot and Ramadorai (2001), and Seasholes (2000) report that  international 
investors appear no less informed than domestics.  All of these studies focus on investors in 
general; there has been little research on why pension funds in particular might display home 
bias. 
 DB pension plans differ from other institutional investors because of the key role played 
by pension liabilities. DB plan liabilities refer to a plan sponsor’s long-term promise to pay an 
eventual benefit. After the enacting of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
pension sponsors must guarantee the solvency and funding status of their DB plans. Therefore 
DB pension plan managers should consider not only their asset returns but also their plans’ 
liabilities. Ignoring liabilities in pension asset allocation may lead to improper investment 
decisions. 
 A DB pension plan’s liability is affected by two categories of factors, namely 
demographic, and economic. The demographic factors include mortality, termination, disability, 
and retirement, all of which will influence plan liabilities. Economic factors such as inflation, 
productivity increase, and capital market performance, also affect plan liabilities through wage 
growth or discount rates. In this paper, the main focus is on the effect of wage growth rates and 
discount rates on plan liabilities and asset allocation, while holding the demographic factors 
constant. Since wage growth rates and discount rates may be correlated with asset returns, our 
hypothesis is that consideration of liability in pension asset allocation may explain part of DB 
pension plan home bias.  
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Pension Asset and Liability Management with International Assets in the Portfolio 
 To assess the role of home bias in pension investment, we adopt and extend the mean-
variance model of Lewis (1999). First, the optimal asset allocation under the asset-only approach 
is calculated. Second, we extend the model to include DB pension liabilities.  Finally, asset 
allocations under the asset-only approach and the asset/liability approach are compared, to 
determine whether there may be home bias introduced by consideration of pension liabilities. 
Pension Asset Allocation under the Asset-Only Approach. For expositional simplicity and 
following Lewis (1999), we suppose there are only two assets, domestic assets and international 
assets.2 The asset allocation problem for the institutional investor is to invest the plan’s wealth in 
these two asset classes. The objective of the investor is to maximize the expected return of his 
portfolio while penalizing the volatility of the return: 
)~(
2
)~(
id x,x
AA RVarREMax
λ−                                      (1) 
where AR  is the total return of the portfolio, and  
iiddA RxRxR
~~~ += , 
where 
Rd is actual return on domestic assets; 
Ri is actual return on international assets; 
µd , σd  are the mean and standard deviation on domestic equity returns; 
µi , σi  are the mean and standard deviation on international equity returns; 
σdi  is covariance between domestic and international equity returns; 
xd is the proportion of total assets invested in domestic equities; 
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xi is the proportion of total assets invested in international equities; and 
 λ is the risk aversion of institutional investors. 
The expected return is iiddA xxRE µµ +=)~( , and the variance of the portfolio is 
diidiiddA xxxxRVar σσσ 2)~( 2222 ++= . After taking into account the restriction 1=+ id xx  and 
solving the F.O.C, the optimal international asset allocation should be: 
.
)~~()~~(
)( 2
di
did
di
di
i RRVarRRVar
x −
−+−
−= σσλ
µµ                                (2) 
If 0>− di µµ , the portfolio share of international asset holdings will increase with the expected 
international equity premium di µµ − , decrease with the risk aversion factor λ, and decrease with 
the variance of the actual return difference, )~~( di RRVar − . Also the portfolio share of 
international investments will increase with the second term on the right hand side, which is the 
portfolio share that minimizes the variance of the wealth portfolio.  
Pension Asset Allocation under Asset/Liability Approach. Maximizing asset returns alone 
might not be a sufficient objective for DB pension plans, if plan managers have multiple 
objectives.3 One important issue is that DB pension plans have to meet solvency and funding 
requirements. Most DB pension plans try to maintain or better their solvency and funding status, 
while limiting the increase and variability of future contributions. Sharpe and Tint (1990) 
propose that a pension plan’s optimal asset allocation can be derived using an asset/liability 
approach, by maximizing the expected surplus under risk penalty. Grinold and Meese (2000) 
recently employed the Sharpe and Tint (1990) approach to derive an optimal international asset 
allocation pattern for institutional investors. However, they did not undertake empirical research 
to compare how their results might differ from those produced by the traditional asset-only 
approach. In the present paper, we adopt and revise the asset/liability approach of Sharpe and 
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Tint (1990) to evaluate the empirical effect of liabilities on DB plan international asset 
allocation.  
In our hypothetical DB pension plan, we represent the active participant pool assuming 
the active worker’s average year of service 0T , and the illustrative retired participant pool 
assuming that the retiree’s average benefit payment is Br. For expositional simplicity, we assume 
there is no demographic change in the plan, so all retired and active participants will survive to 
next year for sure. In a final wage plan, the promised benefit is:  
.*~*~ TWkB =  
where k is a constant proportion of pay, such as 2%; W is the final pay level of plan participants; 
and T represents the worker’s year of service. Suppose the total contribution of the pension plan 
is a certain percentage, m, of wage. Then the annual contribution to the plan is:  
.~*~ WmC =  
In our model, the main concern of the pension manager is the next year’s surplus. This 
amount can be expressed relative to today’s asset value, i.e. 01 /
~ AS . According to Sharp and Tint 
(1990), relating future surplus to today’s asset value is a natural extension of asset-only practice, 
where the dimension of measured risk tolerance is maintained. A DB plan manager will 
maximize 01 /
~ AS , while penalizing its risk. The decision variables are the asset proportion 
invested in domestic and international equities, xd and xi : 
).
~
(
2
~
0
1
0
1
x,x id A
SVar
A
SEMax λ−



                                          (3) 
Then next year’s surplus is 111
~~~ LAS −= , where 1~A , 1~L are next year’s asset and liability levels. In 
this paper, subscript 1 means next year, and 0 means today. All information as of today is 
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known, such as equity returns, pension assets, liabilities, contributions, and benefits paid. For the 
next year, only the benefit payment Br is known, while other variables are stochastic.  
We then suppose that each year, the plan receives one contribution and makes one benefit 
payment at the same time. As of that day, we can rewrite 1
~S  as the total market value of 
investments plus next year’s contribution, minus the benefit payments and next year’s liability: 4 
.~~)~1(~ 1101 LCRAS A −++=  
Next year’s surplus relative to today’s asset is: 
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
~~
)~1(
~
L
L
A
L
W
W
A
W
mR
A
S
A −++=  
       ),~1()~1()~1(
0
0
0
0
LWA RA
LR
A
WmR +−+++=                           (4) 
where WR
~ and LR
~ are the growth rate of wages and liabilities. Plugging (4) into (3), rearranging 
terms and removing those with no uncertainty, over which the asset allocation decision has no 
influence (see details in Appendix 1), the maximization problem becomes: 
).~,~cov()~,~cov()~(
2
)~(
0
0
0
0
x,x id
LAWAAA RRA
LRR
A
WmRVarREMax λλλ +−−              (5) 
The first two terms in (5) are the same as in (1) which ignored pension liabilities. 
Therefore, the difference in the two models lies in the last two terms. Focusing on the last term, 
we define )~,~cov(
0
0
LA RRA
Lλ  as the “asset liability hedging credit”, consistent with Sharpe and 
Tint (1990). This term may have a hedging effect on liability increases if the covariance is 
positive. Therefore, a DB pension plan should alter its asset allocation to take advantage of such 
hedge effects, in order to realize the objective of maximizing pension surplus. Since 
iiddA RxRxR
~~ += , the covariance term )~,~cov( LA RR can be divided into: 
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).~,~()~,~()~,~~()~,~cov( LiiLddLiiddLA RRCovxRRCovxRRxRxCovRR +=+=  
When the covariance )~,~( Ld RRCov or )
~,~( Li RRCov is positive, the corresponding assets 
will help hedge liability increases. The greater a fund manager’s risk aversion, λ, the larger the 
asset liability hedging credit; the lower today’s funding ratio, 
0
0
L
A , the more valuable the hedging 
credit. On the other hand, if the covariance term were zero (or negative), then the corresponding 
asset would have no beneficial (or even a negative) hedging effect.   
 The third term in equation (5), )~,~cov(
0
0
WA RRA
Wmλ− , comes from plan contributions. 
This term implies that wage growth rates may have a hedging effect on equity returns. If there is 
a negative relation between equity returns and wage growth rates, the hedge effect will be 
positive, i.e. the asset decrease in the pension fund due to bad investment performance could be 
offset by increased contributions from wage growth rate increases. The greater the fund 
manager’s risk aversion, λ, and the higher the contribution ratio, the larger wage rate’s hedging 
effect. But if the covariance is positive, the corresponding asset will have a negative hedging 
effect.  
 It is difficult to obtain time series data on pension fund liabilities, so we cannot calculate 
the required covariance terms directly. For this reason, we model the growth rate of liabilities 
and use some proxy variables for sensitivity analysis. In this paper, we use the Accumulated 
Benefit Obligation (ABO) to calculate pension liabilities. ABO represents the on-going plan’s 
liability from the perspective of pension accounting, equaling the present value of accrued 
benefits.5 Today’s ABO can be projected to next year with appropriate approximations. The 
following is a full year projection: 6 
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,)()~1]()()[()( 1001 BErABOhABOABO −++≈  
where : 0)(ABO  refers to the accumulated benefit obligation for all plan members as of today; 
r is the discount rate used with ABO; 
1)(BE  represents yearly expected benefit payments, equal to Br for retirees; and  
h is the fraction of the ABO accounting for service and salary increases. 
For our representative active plan participant, the benefit accrued is expressed as kWTB = . 
The h coefficient to (ABO)0 can be determined as: 
).~1(1~
)1)(~1(~
000
0000
00
0011
0
01
ww
w R
T
R
TkW
TkWTRkW
TkW
TkWTWk
B
BB
h ++=−++=−=−=  
Hence, the liability growth rate, LR
~
 can be expressed as: 
( )
0000
01 ~~~~)11(1
)(
)()(~
L
BrRrR
TTABO
ABOABOR rWWL −++++=−=  
    The liability growth rate, LR
~
 will depend on three stochastic terms: the wage growth rate, 
WR
~
; the discount rate, r~ ; and the product of these two variables, rRW ~
~
.  Therefore, when we 
substitute the expression of LR
~
 into (5), we obtain the final maximization problem: 
.
)~~,~cov(11)~,~cov(11
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2
)~(
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0
0
0
0
, ''

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

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
 ++


 −

 ++−
rRR
TA
LrR
TA
L
RR
A
Wm
TA
LRVarRE
Max
WAA
WAAA
xx id λλ
λλ
        (6) 
The first two terms in (6) are the same as those in (1), where (1) is the maximization 
problem under the asset-only approach.  The objective function (6) under our asset/liability 
management approach also includes three other terms.  All these three terms depend on some 
common factors including risk aversion, λ, the reciprocal of funding ratio, 00 / AL , and the 
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average year of service, T . Except for these common factors, each term also includes some 
unique factors. The third term in (6) depends on the contribution rate, m, the ratio of total wage 
over pension asset as of today, 00 / AW , and the covariance between equity returns and wage 
growth rates. The fourth and last term in (6) also depends on the covariance between equity 
returns and discount rates, and the covariance between equity returns and the product of wage 
growth rates and discount rates respectively.  
After solving the F.O.C. of (6), we have:  
,
)~~()~~(
)( 2'
di
did
di
di
i
RRVarRRVar
UUx −
−+−
−= σσλ                                        (7) 
where, 
)~,~cov(11
0
0
0
0
Wiii RRA
Wm
TA
LU 

 −

 ++= λµ          
);~~,~cov(11)~,~cov(11
0
0
0
0 rRR
TA
LrR
TA
L
Wii 

 ++

 ++ λλ  
)~,~cov(11
0
0
0
0
Wddd RRA
Wm
TA
LU 

 −

 ++= λµ  
).~~,~cov(11)~,~cov(11
0
0
0
0 rRR
TA
LrR
TA
L
Wdd 

 ++

 ++ λλ             (8) 
 
In equation (7), ix '  is the optimal asset proportion invested in international asset under 
the asset/liability management approach. We call iU  in (8) the “liability-adjusted expected return 
on international equity” because it is the expected international equity return, iµ , adjusted by 
three pension liability terms. By the same token, dU  is called the “liability-adjusted expected 
return on domestic equity”. For iU  and dU , if the summation of the last three terms is positive, 
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then the liability-adjusted expected return is greater than the actual expected return. Hence 
consideration of liability gives credit to the corresponding asset return, without affecting the 
variance and covariance of equity returns.  
The only difference between ix '  in (7) and xi in (2) is the numerator of the first term, 
which is the difference between the liability-adjusted expected return instead of the expected 
return as in (2):  
[ ])~,~cov()~,~cov(11)()(
0
0
0
0
WdWididi RRRRA
Wm
TA
LUU −

 −

 +=−−− λµµ  
[ ]
[ ])~~,~cov()~~,~cov(11
)~,~cov()~,~cov(11
0
0
0
0
rRRrRR
TA
L
rRrR
TA
L
WdWi
di
−

 ++
−

 ++
λ
λ
              (9)  
If the right hand side of (9) is negative, (i.e. if some or all of the covariance differences 
are negative,) then ii xx <' . In this case, pension plans should hold less international equities 
but more domestic equities when liabilities are incorporated in the pension asset allocation 
decision.7 Consequently, at least part of a DB plan’s home bias might be attributable to the fact 
that liabilities are captured by the pension asset allocation decision. If the right hand side of (9) is 
zero, then considering pension liabilities does not influence pension asset allocations. This zero 
right hand side could result from three zero covariance differences, or from the offsetting of all 
three terms on the right hand side. If the right hand side of (9) is positive, then the optimal 
investment in international equity under asset/liability management should be greater than under 
the asset management approach, ii xx >' . In this case, the home bias puzzle for pension plans is 
exacerbated. 
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 This model then suggests a null hypothesis: that DB plan home bias is partially 
explained by accounting for DB pension liabilities. This could arise in several ways. First, the 
covariance between domestic wage growth rate and international equity returns may be less than 
the covariance between domestic wage growth rate and domestic equity returns. If a domestic 
bull market lasted for several years, prosperity could boost the wage growth rate. Second, with 
respect to the discount assumption, the Financial Accounting Standard Rule 87 (FAS 87) 
requires the use of a so-called “settlement rate”, i.e. the interest rate for which the DB pension 
obligation could be settled through the purchase of annuities. Many pension funds use the current 
yield on high-yield, long-term corporate bonds as an approximation.8 If the covariance between 
domestic bond returns and domestic stock returns is greater than that between domestic bonds 
and international equities, the second term of (9) could also be negative, consistent with more 
investment in domestic assets. 
Data and Empirical Results 
 To assess how important these factors are in influencing DB plan portfolios, we conduct 
an empirical analysis taking the perspective of U.S. pension plan investors. First, to compare 
results with Lewis (1999), we suppose that our hypothetical pension plan can only invest in 
domestic equities and international equities. We then compare the asset allocations obtained 
when pension liabilities are ignored (as in the Lewis (1999) case) with those obtained when 
pension liabilities are taken into account. Next we add another asset class, namely U.S. bonds, 
and again compare resulting asset allocations. Last, we calculate and compare asset allocation 
when all equity returns and growth rates are real versus nominal.  
The equity data are all taken from historical market indexes. To compare our results with 
Lewis (1999), the data include the period January 1970 to December 1996.9 The Morgan Stanley 
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Capital International, Europe Australia, and Far East index (MSCI EAFE) in US dollars is used 
to calculate foreign equity returns, which include reinvested dividends. For U.S. equity returns, 
the paper uses the S&P 500 total return index with dividends reinvested. The 10-year Treasury 
bond returns series are employed to approximate domestic bond market returns. Seasonally 
unadjusted average hourly earnings and weekly working hours of production workers are used to 
calculate the annual wage growth rate. 10 For the discount rate, the paper uses year-end Moody's 
Aa corporate bond index. 11 The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is employed to calculate the real 
equity and bond returns, as well as real wage growth rates and real discount rates. Descriptions 
of the nominal and real returns appear in Table 2.12 
 Table 2 here 
The second and third columns of Table 2 are for nominal returns. During the period 
January 1970 to December 1996, the mean return on nominal international investments was 15 
percent, higher than the nominal domestic return of 13.6 percent, but the standard deviation of 
nominal international returns of 22.5 percent was also higher than for nominal domestic equity 
returns, of 16.2 percent. Therefore, compared to domestic equity returns, international equity had 
higher returns and higher volatility.13 The nominal average wage growth rate was positive at 4.7 
percent, with a standard deviation of 2.2 percent. The average nominal discount rate was 9.6 
percent with a standard deviation of 2.1 percent. The last two columns of Table 2 show 
descriptive statistics for real returns.  Adjusted by inflation, the mean equity returns were 
smaller, but the standard deviations were larger, than their corresponding nominal counterparts. 
It is also worth to note that the real mean wage growth rate was negative at -0.78, and its 
standard deviation was less than its nominal counterpart.  
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  Correlations between nominal equity returns, wage growth rates, and discount rates are 
shown in Panel A of Table 3. Contrary to our expectation of a positive correlation between wage 
growth rates and domestic equity returns, the actual correlation turned out to be negative at -0.25. 
The main reason is that nominal wage growth rates were sticky, while equity returns were very 
volatile.  These trends are reflected in Figure 1, where nominal wage growth rates changed 
slowly but domestic equity returns moved between –30 percent and +40 percent. Most of time, 
wage growth rates moved in the opposite direction from equity returns. The actual correlation 
between nominal international equity returns and wage growth rates was negative at –0.12, 
smaller than that between domestic equity returns and wage growth rates. The correlation 
between nominal domestic equity returns and discount rates was positive, but small at 0.02. The 
correlation between international equity returns and discount rates was -0.02. The time pattern of 
domestic equity return and discount rate are provided in Figure 2. Compared with equity returns, 
the discount rate curve was rather smooth. 
Table 3, Figure 1, and Figure 2 here 
 Correlations between real equity returns, wage growth rates, and discount rates, are 
reported in Panel B of Table 3. The correlation between real wage growth rates and domestic 
equities returns was positive at 0.35, but the correlation between real wage growth rates and 
international equity returns was also large, at 0.42.14 One possible explanation is that the 
correlation between real domestic and international equity returns was very large, at 56 percent, 
in our data, so the correlations with wage growth rates were also similar. This pattern can be seen 
in Figure 3, where domestic and international equity returns show the similar time trend. Also in 
Figure 3, the real wage growth rates were more volatile and more positively correlated with 
equity returns than the nominal wage growth rates in Figure 1. The correlation between real 
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domestic equity returns and the real discount rate, 0.48, was larger than the correlation between 
real international equity returns and discount rate, 0.43. However the covariance between 
domestic equity returns and the discount rate, 0.0024, was smaller than the covariance between 
international equity returns and the discount rate, 0.0030, because the standard deviation of 
international equity returns was very high. The time pattern of real discount rates, nominal equity 
returns, and international equity returns appear in Figure 4. The real discount rates show more 
volatility than the nominal discount rate in Figure 2. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 here 
 
  Turning to the liability side, we model our hypothetical DB plan as having a funding 
ratio, or the ratio of assets to liabilities, of 100 percent. Going forward, the contribution rate is set 
at 10 percent of total payroll, the ratio of wage over pension asset is 20 percent, and the average 
tenure assumed for active participants is 15 years.15 
 In Table 4, short sales are permitted. Panel A of Table 4 reveals predicted DB plan asset 
allocations based on nominal equity returns, wage growth rates, and discount rates. Here we 
present calculated asset allocations from (2) and (7) using both the asset-only and the asset 
liability/approaches. As in Lewis (1995), we also find home bias in the investment portfolio, 
with projected international asset holdings of 23-56% (under different level of risk aversion level 
λ) versus only 11.5% in 1996.16 Our results indicate that as risk aversion λ rises, investors will 
hold more domestic equity and less foreign equity. This is consistent with previous studies, 
because international assets provide higher returns as well as higher risk. Incorporating DB plan 
liabilities in the asset allocation decision does not increase domestic holdings. On the contrary, it 
slightly increases international asset holdings, though the change is small (less than 1 percent) 
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across the models. Therefore, incorporating the DB plan’s liabilities does not explain pension 
plans’ home bias. 
 Next, we extend the research by adding a third asset class, domestic bonds, which we 
would expect might better track actual pension portfolios. Similar to the two-asset case, we find 
that consideration of liabilities in asset allocation makes DB investors hold slightly more 
international assets, as compared with the asset-only approach. We also show, in the Panel A of 
Table 4, that pension plans are predicted to hold less foreign equities in three-asset case than they 
do in the two-asset case if there are no short sales of domestic bonds. However the changes are 
very small. For example, in the two-asset case and with a risk aversion level of 3, the plan will 
hold 31.37 percent of its portfolios in international assets under the asset-only approach, and 
31.75 percent under the asset/liability approach. These figures change to 29.41 and 29.79 
respectively when domestic bonds are included as an investment option, resulting in a little more 
home bias than the two- asset class case.  
Table 4 here 
As we have shown, incorporating pension liabilities does little to explain DB plans’ home 
bias in a model where all returns are nominal. Next we evaluate what happens if pension asset 
investments are allocated using real asset returns, real wage growth rates, and real discount rates. 
Panel B of Table 4 represents the asset allocations generated under the asset-only approach and 
the asset/liability approach using real returns. Including liabilities in the portfolio decision 
appears to imply that investors will invest a little less in domestic assets, but they will put more 
in international assets, as compared to the asset-only approach. This is because international 
equities do a better job of hedging wage changes and discount rate changes than do domestic 
equities. Consequently, the international investment proportion calculated from (7) is larger than 
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the proportion calculated in (2). Extending the number of asset class from two to three again 
induces investors to invest less in international assets, as compared with the asset-only approach. 
To summarize, using real returns and taking liabilities into account further exacerbates DB 
pension plans’ home bias puzzle.  
In Table 5, short sales are restricted. If the asset proportion invested in domestic bond is 
negative, we set it to zero. Therefore, the asset proportion invested in international equity and 
domestic equity will be the same as the two asset class cases. We reach similar conclusions as in 
the case without short sales constraints as well.   
Table 5 here 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 This paper asks whether including DB pension liabilities in a model of pension asset 
allocation decision can help explain the well-known home bias. Taking the perspective of a US 
investor, we show that incorporating pension liabilities does not explain DB plan home bias 
when nominal returns are modeled. Furthermore, if instead we focus on real returns, 
incorporating plan liabilities makes the home bias puzzle worse. Consequently, we conclude that 
incorporating pension liabilities in the pension asset allocation decision cannot explain home bias 
in DB pension plans. Clearly, such pensions could stand to benefit from additional international 
investment.  
We recognize that the results rely on several simplifying assumptions, which leaves room 
for extensions to this research. For example, one might explore other objective functions, a task 
we hope to undertake in future research. Additionally, this model assumes a representative agent 
whereas more detailed modeling could incorporate alternative demographic factors and their 
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effects on pension asset allocation. Finally, this model does not evaluate hedging currency risk, 
which can be further explored in model extensions.  
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Table 1. Pension Fund Holdings of Foreign Investments (1980 to 1993) 
 
Panel A: Holding of Foreign Securities by pension funds (1980 – 1993): percent of portfolio. 
 
 1980 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Canada 4.1 5.3 5.8 8.5 10.2 10.3 
Germany - 3.8 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.5 
Japan 0.5 6.3 7.2 8.4 8.4 9.0 
United Kingdom 10.1 16.5 18.0 20.8 22 19.7 
United States 0.7 2.7 4.2 4.1 4.6 5.7 
 
 
 
Panel B: U.S Pension Funds’ Holding of Foreign Investments (1994-1998): percent of portfolio. 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
U.S. Pension Funds 10.4 10.4 11.5 12.3 11.8 
 
Source: Panel A from Lewis (1999). Panel B from Greenwich Associates, kindly provided by 
Richard Marston. Because of the different sources of data for Panel A and B, there may 
exist discrepancy for US pension fund. 
 
Note:  “-” means Not Available. 
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Table 2. Description of Equity Returns, Wage Growth Rates, and Discount Rate (1970-1996) 
 Nominal Real 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Foreign equity 
return(Ri) 15.00 22.52 9.29 22.86 
Domestic equity return 
(Rd) 13.56 16.20 7.86 16.54 
Domestic bond return 
(Rb) 9.91 10.23 4.36 11.34 
Wage growth rate (Rw) 4.73 2.22 -0.78 2.42 
Discount rate (r) 9.57 2.12 4.05 3.11 
Product of wage growth 
and discount rate (rRw) 0.47 0.28 0.01 0.08 
 
Notes: MSCI EAFE total return index used for foreign equity returns. S&P 500 total return index 
used for domestic equity returns. 10-year treasury bond return used for domestic bond returns. 
All monthly data are annualized. The data of MSCI EAFE are from Datastream. S&P500 and 10 
year treasury bond are from CRSP. Seasonally unadjusted average hourly earnings of production 
workers used for the annual wage growth rate. The average of Moody's Aa corporate bond index 
is used for the discount rate. Data on average hourly earnings and weekly working hours of 
production workers are from the web site of Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov. 
Moody’s Aa corporate bond index data are from Bloomberg. Consumer Price Index (CPI) is 
employed to calculate the real equity and bond returns, as well as real wage growth rates and real 
discount rates. 
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Table 3. Correlations Between Equity Returns, Wage Growth Rates, and Discount Rates (1970-
1996) 
 
Panel A. Nominal returns  
 Ri Rd Rb Rw R rRw 
Foreign equity return(Ri) 1.00  
Domestic equity return 
(Rd) 0.51 1.00  
Domestic bond return 
(Rb) 0.08 0.41 1.00  
Wage growth rate (Rw) -0.12 -0.25 -0.35 1.00  
Discount rate (r) -0.02 0.02
-7.0e-
04 0.30 1.00  
Product of wage growth 
and discount rate (rRw) -0.13 -0.18 -0.28 0.88 0.68 1.00 
  
Panel B. Real returns  
 Ri Rd Rb Rw R rRw 
Foreign equity return(Ri) 1.00  
Domestic equity return 
(Rd) 0.56 1.00  
Domestic bond return 
(Rb) 0.24 0.53 1.00  
Wage growth rate (Rw) 0.42 0.35 0.34 1.00  
Discount rate (r) 0.43 0.48 0.54 0.59 1.00  
Product of wage growth 
and discount rate (rRw) -0.05 -0.19 -0.05 0.27 -0.20 1.00 
Note: Author’s tabulations from data described in Table 2.  
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Table 4. Optimal Asset Allocations for U.S. Pension Plans (Short Sales Permitted) 
Panel A. Nominal Returns     
 Model Asset class λ=1 λ=2 λ=3 λ=10 
Foreign equity 55.52 37.41 31.37 22.92 Asset-only  
Domestic equity 44.48 62.59 68.63 77.08 
Foreign equity 55.89 37.78 31.75 23.3 
Two asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic equity 44.11 62.22 68.25 76.7 
Foreign equity 61.19 37.35 29.41 18.28 
Domestic equity 119.66 61.85 42.58 15.61 Asset-only  
Domestic Bond -80.85 0.8 28.01 66.11 
Foreign equity 61.57 37.73 29.79 18.55 
Domestic equity 119.37 61.56 42.29 15.31 
Three asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic Bond -80.94 0.71 27.92 66.14 
       
Panel B. Real Returns         
Foreign equity 55.05 35.8 29.39 20.4 Asset-only  
Domestic equity 44.95 64.2 70.61 79.6 
Foreign equity 59.35 40.01 33.68 24.7 
Two asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic equity 40.65 59.99 66.32 75.3 
Foreign equity 61.21 36.13 27.78 16.07 
Domestic equity 133.56 68.97 47.44 17.3 Asset-only  
Domestic Bond -94.77 -5.1 24.78 66.63 
Foreign equity 65.89 40.81 32.45 20.75 
Domestic equity 134.8 70.22 48.69 18.55 
Three asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic Bond -100.69 -11.03 18.86 60.7 
 
Source: Author’s tabulation 
 
Notes:  
Two asset class includes domestic and international equities. Three asset class includes 
international stocks, domestic stocks and domestic bonds.  In this table, there are no short sales 
constrictions.  The asset proportions could be negative. 
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Table 5. Optimal Asset Allocations for U.S. Pension Plans (Short Sales Restricted) 
Panel A. Nominal Returns     
 Model Asset class λ=1 λ=2 λ=3 λ=10 
Foreign equity 55.52 37.41 31.37 22.92 Asset-only  
Domestic equity 44.48 62.59 68.63 77.08 
Foreign equity 55.89 37.78 31.75 23.3 
Two asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic equity 44.11 62.22 68.25 76.7 
Foreign equity 55.52 37.35 29.41 18.28 
Domestic equity 44.48 61.85 42.58 15.61 Asset-only  
Domestic Bond 0 0.8 28.01 66.11 
Foreign equity 55.89 37.73 29.79 18.55 
Domestic equity 44.11 61.56 42.29 15.31 
Three asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic Bond 0 0.71 27.92 66.14 
       
Panel B. Real Returns         
Foreign equity 55.05 35.8 29.39 20.4 Asset-only  
Domestic equity 44.95 64.2 70.61 79.6 
Foreign equity 59.35 40.01 33.68 24.7 
Two asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic equity 40.65 59.99 66.32 75.3 
Foreign equity 55.05 35.8 27.78 16.07 
Domestic equity 44.95 64.2 47.44 17.3 Asset-only  
Domestic Bond 0 0 24.78 66.63 
Foreign equity 59.35 40.01 32.45 20.75 
Domestic equity 40.65 59.99 48.69 18.55 
Three asset class 
Asset/Liability  
Domestic Bond 0 0 18.86 60.7 
 
Source: Author’s tabulations 
 
Notes: Two asset class includes domestic and international equities. Three asset class includes 
international stocks, domestic stocks and domestic bonds. In this table, short sales are restricted. 
If the asset proportion invested in domestic bond is negative, we set it to zero. Therefore, the 
asset proportion invested in international equity and domestic equity will be the same as the two 
asset class cases.  
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Figure 1.  Time Pattern of Nominal Wage Growth Rates, Domestic Equity Returns,  
and International Equity Returns. 
 
Source: From data described in Table 2.  
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Figure 2. Time Pattern of Nominal Discount Rates, Domestic Equity Returns,  
and International Equity Returns. 
 
Source: From data described in Table 2. 
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Figure 3.  Time Pattern of Real Wage Growth Rates, Domestic Equity Returns,  
and International Equity Returns  
 
Source: From data described in Table 2. 
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Figure 4.  Time Pattern of Real Discount Rates, Domestic Equity Returns,  
and International Equity Returns. 
 
Source: From data described in Table 2. 
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Appendix 1. The derivation of maximization problem (5) 
The maximization problem (3) is the following problem 
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where WR
~ and LR
~ are the growth rate of wage and liability. The first bracketed expression 
involves no uncertainty, so asset allocation decisions cannot affect it. For purpose of decision-
making, one can concentrate entirely on the second expression. 
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Since our decision variable is asset allocation proportion, xi and xd, we can ignore the terms not 
affected by asset allocation, such as the second, third and last term, without affecting the final 
result. Then the maximization problem is simplified to  
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Appendix 2. Variable Definitions 
Note: for subscript i, i=1 means next year, and i=0 means today. 
 iA
~    DB plan asset at time i. 
B~   Final pay pension benefit. TWkB *~*~ = . 
Br   Average benefit payment, constant. 
 C~   Total contribution of the pension plan is a certain percentage.  
1)(BE   Yearly expected benefit payments.  
h   Fraction of ABO to account for service and salary increase. 
k   A constant factor of final pay.  
 iL
~    DB plan liability at time i. 
m Pension plan contribution rate, as a constant proportion of payroll of wage.  
r   Discount rate used with ABO. 
 AR
~   Total portfolio return. 
dR
~   Actual return on domestic assets. 
iR
~   Actual return on international assets. 
 LR
~   Liability growth rate. 
 WR
~   Wage growth rate. 
 iS
~   DB plan’s surplus in year i. iii LAS
~~~ −= . 
iT   Year of service at time i. 
0T  Average years of service of active plan participants as of today, constant. 
 iU   Liability-adjusted expected return on international equity. 
dU    Liability-adjusted expected return on domestic equity  
 W~   The wage of plan participants at year i.  
xd   Proportion of total assets invested in domestic equities. 
xi   Proportion of total assets invested in international equities.   
µd , σd   Expected return and standard deviation on domestic equity returns. 
µi , σi   Expected return and standard deviation on international equity returns. 
 σdi    Covariance between domestic and international equity returns. 
λ Risk aversion of institutional investors. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 See details in Lewis (1999). 
2 Tesar and Ingrid Werner (1995) show that home bias appears in bonds as well as equity, further 
deepening the home bias puzzle. Here, we focus on the equity market, and below we include 
bonds to see if the empirical results differ.  
3 More detailed discussion of pension fund investment objectives see Muralidhar (2001). 
4 This supposes no amortizations of unfunded liabilities from previous years. 
5 The accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) and the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) are 
defined under the Financial Accounting Standard 87 (FAS 87), where the primary objective is to 
achieve consistency, uniformity, and comparability with respect to pension plan accounting 
among plan sponsors. See details in Winklevoss (1993). 
6 This approximation is from Chapter 11, Winklevoss (1993). The original formula is  
( )iBEiABOhABOABO tttt 2/11)()1]()()[()( 1 +−++≈+  
The fractional coefficient in the last term is intended to represent a weighted average of monthly 
benefit payments throughout the year. But for simplicity in this paper, we assume pension benefit 
payment is made only once a year. Therefore, this term is changed to 1)(BE  instead. 
7 Most of the time 

 −

 +
0
0
0
0 11
A
W
m
TA
Lλ >0, because for a pension plan with several years of 
history and a good funding status, total liabilities L0 should be greater than annual contributions 
mW0. 
8 See details in Winklevoss (1993). 
9  In an unreported simulation, we calculate the optimal asset allocation using the data from 
December 1929 to December 2001. Our main results do not change with the new data period. 
However, the international index is “GFD World x/USA $ Return Index” from Global Financial 
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Data, Inc., instead of MSCI EAFE index used in the paper because EAFE is only available since 
December 1969.  
10 Average hourly earnings and weekly working hours of production workers are from the web 
site of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov.  
11 Moore and Peskin (2002) show that the end of year Moody’s Aa index tracks the average 
FAS 87 discount rates closely.  
12 MSCI EAFE data are from Datastream. S&P500, 10 year treasury bond and CPI data are 
drawn from CRSP. We annualized monthly data first to calculate annual asset allocations. See 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1976) for detailed annualizing method. 
13 Our mean and variances for the EAFE and S&P 500 indices differ from those reported by 
Lewis (1999), because we use different methods to compute descriptive statistics. We 
compounded the monthly returns to get annual returns, and then calculated the variance of 
annual returns. But Lewis (1999) calculated the arithmetic mean and variance-covariance matrix 
of monthly data, then annualized these mean and variance by multiplying 12.  
14 This pattern is similar to Baxter and Jermann (1997) who examined the correlations between 
labor growth and capital growth rates over 1960 -1993. They found that the correlation between 
U.S earnings growth rate and U.S. capital growth rate was 0.54, while the correlation between 
U.S. earnings growth and capital growth rates in Japan, Germany and the U.K. were 0.55, 0.47 
and 0.48 respectively. Their measure of labor income is total employee compensation; their 
measure of capital income is GDP at factor cost minus employee compensation. 
15 We have also varied these parameters to investigate the robustness of results, but we find little 
sensitivity. For example, when the funding ratio is valued between 50 and 200 percent, the 
implied international investment proportion changes by only 1 percent. 
  
33
 
16 These projected asset allocations under the two asset class model differ from those in Lewis 
(1995) because the methodologies of annualizing data are different. 
